Firms spend substantial resources on creating and maintaining customer relationships. We explore the role of this customer capital for firm level and aggregate dynamics. Building on the neoclassical adjustment cost model of investment, we propose a tractable search theoretic general equilibrium model of long-term customer relationships. Frictional product markets require firms to spend resources on sales efforts, and cause existing customers to be partially locked-in. Our model implies that in more frictional product markets, where firms selling expenses are higher, measured profit rates, Tobin's q and markups are higher. Sales and investment are less volatile and exhibit hump-shaped responses to shocks. As a result, the model also reproduces the well-documented failure of investment-q regressions. We document that these patterns are present in Compustat data.
Introduction
Firms spend substantial resources on creating and maintaining customer relationships: The share of the US labor force employed in sales related occupations is as much as 11 percent today. The annual spending by US businesses on advertising alone amounts to roughly $300 billion. Although concerns of building and maintaining a customer base feature prominently in the industrial organization and marketing literatures, they have proven challenging to incorporate into the general equilibrium models used by macroeconomists. In this paper we develop a tractable macroeconomic model where frictional product markets lead to selling and buying emerging as purposeful economic activities. Introducing product market frictions has a number of important implications for firms -particularly firm dynamics. We use firm-level data from Compustat to provide evidence of these implications, exploiting crosssectional differences in the degree of selling expenses across markets.
We develop a search-theoretic general equilibrium model of frictional product markets, which nests the neoclassical adjustment cost model of investment, and makes use of the MortensenPissarides matching model with directed search to maintain tractability. In the model, product market frictions are associated with informational frictions between firms and potential customers regarding product characteristics. To overcome these frictions, firms must hire sales people to meet with potential customers, and consumers spend time searching for suppliers. Frictions in creating new customer relationships also imply that customers continue to buy from the same firm for some time, turning the customer base into a state variable for the firm. To make the impact of this state variable for firm dynamics as clear as possible, we abstract from an intensive margin by assuming each customer buys a fixed quantity of the good per period. As standard in models of directed search, firms influence new customer acquisition through pricing, in addition to the size of their sales force. Equilibrium pricing involves an initial discount to new customers, with firms charging existing customers a price which leaves them indifferent between continuing the customer relationship or not.
1
The model has a number of implications. First, frictional product markets generate a form of intangible capital embodied in the firm's customer base. When customer relationships are long-term in nature and the costs of customer acquisition paid up front, the present value of firm profits from a new customer relationship must make up for the initial costs of attracting the customer. This turns existing customers into valuable assets to the firm. Frictional product markets thus raise firm value above the value of physical capital, profit rates above the cost of capital, as well as imply positive markups.
Second, frictional product markets affect firm dynamics. On the one hand, by imposing a convex cost on customer base expansion, they reduce the variability of firm investment, sales, profits, and Tobin's q. On the other, due to the complementarity of customer capital with physical capital, they alter the timing of firm responses to shocks. In the neoclassical adjustment cost model, firms respond to a positive productivity shock with an on-impact increase in investment and sales. Under frictional product markets, however, an increase in productivity leaves the firm short of customers to sell to. The firm expands its customer base by hiring more sales people, but the convex costs of customer base expansion smooth this expansion in sales over time. As a result, the response of investment becomes humpshaped: investment continues to rise as the customer base grows and the firm eventually finds itself short of production capacity. These effects on firm dynamics make frictional product markets promising for understanding the documented hump-shapes in the responses of macro-aggregates to aggregate shocks, especially those in aggregate investment. Third, these changes in firm dynamics have implications for the investment-q literature, which documents that the simple prediction of the neoclassical adjustment cost modelthat Tobin's q be a sufficient statistic for firm investment -has little success empirically.
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Frictional product markets offer a potential explanation for this evidence by breaking the perfect correlation between investment and Tobin's q implied by the neoclassical model. Plausibly parameterized, these frictions reduce the coefficient estimate in an investment-q regression by a factor of four. Moreover, as found in the data, the model predicts firm profits to have stronger explanatory power for investment than Tobin's q. This occurs because profits share the hump-shaped response of investment to shocks, while Tobin's q does not.
Finally, to establish the empirical relevance of the model mechanism, we use firm-level data from Compustat to study the predictions of the model across a broad range of markets. Our empirical strategy exploits differences across markets in the importance of product market frictions, leading to differences in average selling expenses. Sorting markets according to selling expenses thus allows us to compare markets characterized by differing degrees of friction. We document support for each the three main predictions of the model: i) the average levels of Tobin's q, profits, and markups, ii) the volatility and dynamic patterns, and iii) the investment-q regressions -both at the firm, industry, and aggregate level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and Section 3 studies its implications. Section 4 discusses the empirical evidence. Section 5 discusses related literature.
The Model
This section introduces a competitive general equilibrium model designed for analyzing the effects of frictional product markets on firm investment, sales, profits, value and their dynamic responses to shocks. The model economy is populated by a representative household and a cross section of firms facing idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity. We focus on a stationary competitive equilibrium, formulating a corresponding planning problem at the end of the section.
Firms Production is carried out by a continuum of measure one firms, each producing a differentiated good with a Cobb-Douglas production technology y = f (k, l p , z). The firms sell their goods through a frictional product market to the household, which converts them into a homogenous good used for consumption and investment. This homogenous good acts both as medium of exchange and numeraire in the economy. Firms accumulate capital according to a law of motion k ′ = (1 − δ k )k + i. Existing capital depreciates at rate δ k , while new investment entails a cost φ(i, k) including both the purchase price of capital and a convex adjustment cost. Firms hire production labor l p from a frictionless market. Firmspecific productivity z follows a Markovian stochastic process with a bounded support and a continuous and monotone transition function.
Household The representative household consumes the homogenous good and leisure, with preferences 
The household allocates its time between leisure, market work l 
for all t ≥ 0. As income, the household receives the aggregated dividends, Π t , as well as the wages for market work, w t . Moreover, product search also yields a positive return, w b t , discussed below. This household problem determines both the supply of labor to both market work and search, as well as the demand for the homogenous good. The good is procured through a frictional product market, and its supply determined by the firm problem below.
Frictional product market The household allocates a share of its infinitesimal members to product search, and those members do so independently (without household coordination), seeking to maximize the return to search. The firms produce differentiated goods, but not all household members are willing to buy all of these goods. In particular, we assume that each searching household member must meet with a firm representative to determine whether he is willing to buy the firm's product or not. To allow these meetings to take place, firms must hire sales people. Moreover, the measure of sales people needed to achieve l s efficiency units of sales people, κ(l s ), is assumed to be an increasing and convex function: the more a firm seeks to expand, the less effective sales locations and sales people it will need to expand to.
As sales people are situated in different sales locations, and potential customers search independently, it is likely to occur that simultaneously some sales people will have no potential customers, while others face a queue waiting to be served. We use a firm-level matching function 5 to capture these ideas: If the measure of potential customers seeking to meet with a firm's sales people l s during a period is l b , the measure of new customer relationships is given by m(l
where ξ > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1). This measure is a product of the fixed probability of a meeting leading to a purchase, and the measure of meetings taking place. Increasing sales people increases meetings, but at a diminishing rate as these sales people are exceedingly likely to be idle part of the time. Increasing potential customers increases meetings, but at a diminishing rate as they are exceedingly likely to run into occupied sales people part of the time. Using θ = l b /l s to denote the average queue length facing a firm's sales people, the rate of matching per sales person becomes η(θ) = ξθ γ .
For thinking about the returns to search, it is useful to start by considering existing customer relationships. If maintaining an existing relationship does not involve a cost to the customer (in terms of time or goods), the relationship will continues as long as the customer is willing to continue to buy a unit of the good per period, and the firm to produce it. Because the customer values the good at one unit of the homogenous good, that is how much he is willing to pay. Given this kinked demand, the firm charges the highest price it can without driving the customer away. In principle the firm could schedule these payments in different ways over time, while maintaining the same present value, but if the firm cannot commit to future prices, then it will price at exactly one unit of the homogenous good each period. While assuming firms cannot commit to keeping prices low in the long run, we do allow commitment to an initial discount which firm can use to influence the measure of potential customers.
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Each period each searching household member chooses a firm to contact, aware of the set of discounts ε offered by all firms, as well as the corresponding queue lengths θ. The return to search w b must be consistent with household optimization, i.e.
where the present discounted value of a match is simply ε. If the household member contacts a firm offering discount ε with queue length θ, the rate of matching is µ(θ) = ξθ γ−1 . Within a match, the firm delivers one unit of the differentiated good to the household member each period. The household pays the firm 1 − ε units of the homogenous good in the first period and one unit in later periods. The household can make these payments in the newly converted homogenous good, leaving ε units over in the first period.
7 Note that according to equation (3), searching household members can be indifferent between firms offering high and low discounts, if the queue length is sufficiently shorter in the low-discount firms.
Firm problem With this, the firm problem in a stationary equilibrium with constant wages and return to search is
where all choice variables except investment are non-negative. If the initial customer base of the firm is n, by hiring sales labor l s with queue length θ, the firm attracts l s η(θ) additional customers. After producing y = n+ l s η(θ) units of the differentiated good, the firm sells that good one-for-one for the homogenous good, giving the discounts to new customers. Equation (4) states that the firm cannot sell more than its customer base allows, while equation (5) determines how much production labor ℓ(k, y, z) is needed to produce output y. Equations (6) and (7) are laws of motion for physical and customer capital, assuming the customer base depreciates at rate δ n for idiosyncratic reasons. Finally, equation (8) imposes rational expectations regarding the queue length implied by the firm's pricing policy ε. Here the firm takes as given the market-determined return to search w b , and expects a queue that leaves customers indifferent between contacting this firm versus attaining the market return somewhere else. The revenue left over after deducting the costs of wages and investment is paid out in dividends π to the household. Note that as long as the household chooses to spend time in both market work and search in equilibrium, it must be that w b = w.
Notice that the convex adjustment costs imply that even though firms face constant returns to scale in production technologies, all production will not be taken over by the most productive firms. The physical adjustment cost works to curb changes in firm size from period to period, while the customer base friction tends to also bound firm size from above. In what follows we will assume that the depreciation rate on the customer base is sufficiently great to guarantee that all firms will hire a non-negative measure of sales personnel.
The firm problem implies that the marginal value of an additional customer is forwardlooking, satisfying
An additional customer increases today's sales revenue by one unit, and production costs by wℓ y (k, y, z). Moreover, with probability 1 − δ n the customer stays with the firm also into the following period, delivering the continuation value βE z v n (k ′ , n ′ , z ′ |w, w b ). The value also depends on the firm's current productivity and capital, which affect the cost of production.
The firm hires sales people until the cost of an additional customer equals the benefit:
The marginal costs, on the left, consist of the wages of additional sales people together with the discounts given to new customers. The optimal choice of sales people depends both on the firm's current productivity and capital, as well as its existing customer base. These costs of acquiring new customers generally imply that existing customers are valuable to firms.
The choice of discount balances the costs of raising the discount with the benefits of attracting more customers per sales person. Because the firm cares about the product of the matching rate with the value of a new customer, the firm raises the discount until the percentage cost of increasing the discount equals the percentage gain in new customers, i.e.
The left hand side represents the marginal percentage cost in profits from an increase in the discount, and the right the corresponding percentage increase in customers. A marginal increase in the discount increases the value of the match to the customer by 1/ε in percentage terms, leading to a percentage increase in new customers of γ/(1 − γ) × 1/ε. This expression highlights that the size of the optimal discount depends on the degree of congestion in matching, captured by the elasticity of the matching function: If sales people cannot accommodate additional customers per period, there is no point in offering high discounts.
Combining equations (8), (10), and (11) yields the following result, which implies that in equilibrium firms hiring more sales people also offer bigger discounts and attract longer queues:
PROPOSITION 1. Within a market, a firm's queue and discount are increasing in its choice of sales personnel l
Investment The firm invests in physical capital according to a familiar rule,
equating the marginal cost of investment to the discounted value of additional capital next period, i.e. marginal q. Adopting the usual quadratic adjustment cost function for physical investment implies a linear relationship between the investment rate i/k and marginal q. In these circumstances a frictionless product market would imply that the investment rate be a linear function also of Tobin's q, v(k
as the latter equals marginal q. 9 Product market frictions break this linear relationship by introducing a time-varying wedge between marginal and Tobin's q, however, offering a potential explanation for the weak correlation of the two variables in the data. We illustrate this change in dynamics in Section 3.
Aggregation Before defining an equilibrium, we need to define a number of aggregate variables. To simplify notation, we denote a firm's state as x = (k, n, z). The cross-sectional distribution of firms across physical capital, customer capital and productivity can then be written as λ(x). The distribution evolves over time according to a law of motion λ ′ = T (λ|w, w b ), determined by the productivity process and firm decision rules, but we focus on a stationary distribution where λ ′ = λ. Integrating over the stationary distribution yields aggregate output Y (λ|w, w b ) = y(x|w, w b )dλ(x), and costs of investment Φ(λ|w,
The aggregate demand for labor, used in production and sales, is
, where π denotes the firm-level dividend.
, iv) wage w, v) return to search w b , and vi) distribution of firms λ, such that 1. The firm decision rules and value function solve the firm problem (F).
2. The household decision rules maximize (1) subject to (2), and optimal search behavior solves problem (3).
3. Goods market clears:
6. Stationarity: The distribution of firms λ follows the law of motion
Planning problem Consider the following planning problem
where the choice variables are c, l and functions
, for all x ∈ supp(λ). The planner maximizes the utility of the representative household, allocating goods between consumption and investment, and time between leisure, production, selling and buying. The planner is assumed to face the same production-unit level frictions in bringing together consumers and producers, with the long-term relationships that ensue. The planner thus needs to keep track of the customer bases of production units. Equation (13) states that the sum of goods consumed and invested in all production units cannot exceed the sum of goods supplied by production units. Equation (14) states that the total time allocated to leisure, production, sales and buying cannot exceed the total time endowment. Equations (15) and (16) state that the supply of goods by each production unit cannot exceed the output nor customer base of the producer. Equations (17) and (18) are laws of motion for the customer base and stock of physical capital. The planner allocates investment, as well as production, sales and buying time for each production unit separately, depending on their productivity, physical capital and customer base. This planning problem is concave and, as Appendix A shows, has first order conditions that coincide with those of the competitive equilibrium. This means that not only is the competitive equilibrium constrained efficient, but that the planning problem is useful for understanding the allocation of goods and time in the competitive equilibrium. For a more detailed analysis of the connection between the planning solution and market equilibrium we refer the reader to Kaas and Kircher (2011) , who analyze a related environment with frictional labor (rather than product) markets.
Implications of Customer Capital
How do product market frictions affect firm investment, sales, profits, value and their dynamic responses to shocks? In this section we study these questions with the neoclassical adjustment cost model as our point of departure. In line with the model in Section 2, we focus on firm responses to idiosyncratic firm-level shocks first, turning to aggregate level shocks at the end of the section.
Parametrization To illustrate the effects of frictions, as well as to get a rough idea of magnitudes, we parameterize and solve the model numerically.
11 This is straightforward for a number of the parameters of the model, which are standard in the literature, but requires more thought for the parameters governing the frictional product market, as there is little prior work calibrating these frictions. We use available evidence to pin down values, returning to examine sensitivity later.
We first adopt a conventional parametrization of the neoclassical adjustment cost model as our starting point (the model is solved on a monthly frequency, but we report annual values here): We set the annual discount rate to β = 0.95. We set the depreciation rate of capital to δ k = 0.1, and share of capital α = 0.3 in our production function f (k, l, z) = zk α l 1−α . Our physical adjustment cost (which includes the purchase cost of capital) is φ(i, k)
There is a wide range of estimates for the adjustment cost parameter ϕ k . We pick a value of ϕ k = 10, which corresponds to a middle ground between studies such as (Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995) , who find a parameter around 6, and Erickson and Whited (2000) , who obtain estimates around 20.
12 We adopt the preferences u(c, l) = log c + A log l, where A is set such that market work comes to a third of total time (Hansen 1985) . (The form of preferences is largely irrelevant for responses to firm-level shocks, but plays an important role for responses to aggregate shocks.) For the productivity process, we follow the estimates of Hennessy and Whited (2005) , with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.74 and a standard deviation of the shock of 0.123.
The remaining parameters pertain to the frictional product market: the customer depreciation rate δ n , the matching function parameters ξ and γ, and the cost function κ(s). The customer depreciation rate δ n is a key parameter for the impact of frictional markets. Even though firms in some industries regularly announce customer turnover rates, and such rates play an important role in the marketing literature on customer equity, there appears to be little systematic evidence on the topic. Some examples of customer turnover rates include the following:
13 Cell phone service providers are recently reporting monthly turnover rates of 1-2.5 percent, translating into annual rates of 11-26 percent. In online banking the corresponding annual rates are in the 10-20 percent range. Both are examples of products with contractual long-term customer relationships, which makes the customer turnover rate a natural statistic for firms to follow. For an example where this is not the case, survey evidence on the frequency at which consumers switch their primary super market suggests annual turnover rates of 10-25 percent. Acknowledging significant heterogeneity across products on this dimension, we adopt an annual customer depreciation rate of δ n = 15 percent.
Finally, the parameters γ and ξ of the matching function
1−γ are determined based on evidence on total time spent in buying and selling activities at the aggregate level, i.e. l b and κ(l s )dλ. 14 Our targets for these two values are 0.53 and 2.13 percent of total time, respectively. Note that these targets are well below the one third of total time typically attributed to market work. To arrive at these targets we use data on: i) the share of the labor force in sales-related occupations from the Occupational Employment Statistics 11 See Appendix B for details on the numerical method. 12 By contrast, the direct investment-q regression evidence suggests a parameter around 30. 13 See Raice (2010) , Ackermann (2010) , FMI (1994 ), FMI (2004 . 14 See Appendix B for details.
(OES) survey, and ii) the amount of time spent by consumers in shopping from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
According to the OES survey, 11 percent of workers are employed in sales-related occupations.
15 Examples of such occupations include sales representatives, retail salespersons, cashiers, real estate brokers, and advertising agents. Because workers in other occupations are likely to spend a share of their time in sales related activities also, we attribute 10 percent of their time to sales as well. Examples of other occupations with a significant selling component are waiters, marketing and sales managers, and advertising and promotions managers. Overall, this implies that 20 percent of working time is spent in sales activities.
16 Given that working time makes up a third of total time, this yields a share of total time in selling of 6.5 percent. Finally, unlike in the model, in reality not all of this time is spent on new customers. To take this into account, we attribute a third of selling time to new customer acquisition, leading to our 2.13 percent number for total time spent in selling.
Turning to our target for time spent buying, the time-use data document that the average time spent shopping is 0.4 hours per day. If we again attribute a third of this to the new customer margin, our target for buying time becomes 0.53 percent. Finally, we adopt a quadratic cost of sales effort κ(l
Because the value of κ 0 does not change the results aside from changing the value of ξ, we can normalize κ 0 = 1. Table 1 summarizes our parametrization. Next, we turn to studying the impact of product market frictions on firms.
Level effects Product market frictions affect firms in a number of ways. Most directly, the greater the frictions, the more firms spend on customer acquisition. The top left panel in Figure 1 illustrates this by plotting steady-state selling expenses as a function of the matching function coefficient ξ. In the frictionless limit, shown on the left, the model reduces to the neoclassical adjustment cost model, where selling expenses are zero. In our benchmark parametrization indicated by the vertical line, on the other hand, these expenses make up as much as five percent of sales revenue.
Product market frictions turn the customer base into a form of intangible capital, which manifests itself in increased firm value, profits, and markups. In the frictionless limit, Tobin's q equals one (firm value equals the value of physical capital), markups zero, and the profit rate the cost of capital, r + δ k ≈ 0.15. In a frictional market, competition for new customers drives the value of the marginal new customer to zero, but firm value still exceeds the value of physical capital for two reasons. First, the value of the average new customer exceeds that of the marginal due to the convex costs of customer acquisition. Second, existing customers are valuable assets to the firm because the firm charges a positive markup on these customers to make up for the initial costs of attracting them. These forces raise Tobin's q as high as 1.9 in our benchmark parametrization, with an average markup (across new and existing customers) of 15 percent. Due to the upfront costs of customer acquisition, calculating firm profits across new and existing customers leads to an average profit rate of 20 percent.
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While these markups also manifest themselves in increased sales revenue per unit of capital, the steady-state investment rate remains equal to the depreciation rate of capital.
These changes in levels make the testable predictions that ceteris paribus in markets with greater product market frictions, we should see greater average Tobin's q, profit rates and markups, yet similar investment rates, than in markets with lesser frictions. Moreover, the increasing relationship between product market frictions and selling expenses suggests using data on selling expenses to quantify the degree of friction.
Firm dynamics For thinking about the effects of product market frictions on firm dynamics it is useful to start from the frictionless limit, i.e. the neoclassical adjustment cost model. In that model, an increase in firm productivity raises the marginal product of capital, and the resulting increase in the shadow value of additional capital leads to an increase in investment. 18 The physical adjustment cost curbs this investment increase, however, smoothing it out over time. The dashed line in Figure 2 illustrates these dynamics in response to a persistent increase in firm productivity. The figure shows investment rising on impact, and decaying with productivity. As shown by Hayashi (1982) , in this frictionless limit Tobin's q equals the shadow value of capital, and the responses of investment and Tobin's q are thus proportional. Firm sales and profits rise on impact with productivity, but selling expenses play no role in this instantaneous expansion.
Introducing product market frictions has two main effects on these firm dynamics. First, by effectively imposing an additional adjustment cost on firm expansion, they work to dampen firm responses to the shock. Second, by slowing down the expansion in sales, they generate hump-shaped responses to the shock in a number of variables. The responses shown in Figure  2 for our frictional benchmark model illustrate exactly these changes.
The response of investment continues to follow the shadow value of capital, but the frictions introduce a time-varying wedge between this shadow value and Tobin's q, explaining the Notes: The figure plots the steady state as a function of the matching function parameter ξ. The frictionless limit is on the left, and the vertical line indicates our baseline parametrization. Selling expenses refer to wκ(s), sales to (1 − l s η(θ)ε)y, profit to sales net of labor costs of production and sales, and the markup to sales per unit sold 1 − l s η(θ)ε/y over the marginal cost wl
differing responses of investment and Tobin's q in the figure. The increase in productivity increases the firm's production capacity, but leaves the firm short of customers to sell to. This shortage of customers curbs the increase in the shadow value of capital, as well as firm sales, in the short run. The first order of business following the shock is thus an expansion in the customer base through an increase in selling expenses, smoothed out over time due to the convex costs of customer base expansion.
19 While investment thus rises on impact, it continues to rise further as the firm accumulates customers and eventually finds itself short of production capacity, generating a hump-shaped response. The response of firm profits is also hump-shaped: despite the increase in selling expenses, profits rise on impact as production costs fall, but they also continue to rise as the surge in selling expenses subsides and the customer base grows. Tobin's q rises on impact because it discounts the entire stream of future profits. More precisely, Tobin's q rises both because of the increase in the shadow value of capital, and the increase in the value of the firm's customer base when production costs fall. Based on the monotonically decaying response of Tobin's q in the figure, the latter effect appears to dominate.
These changes in dynamics make the testable predictions that ceteris paribus in markets with greater product market frictions, we should see: i) dampened firm responses to shocks 19 The convexity of κ(s) is important for this smoothing when studying responses to firm level shocks, as otherwise firms would expand the customer base on impact, constrained only by the physical adjustment cost. To see this, note that the reduced form of the left hand side of the first order condition (10) for l s is in a range of variables, and ii) investment, profit and sales lagging Tobin's q and selling expenses more strongly.
Investment regressions These changes in dynamics suggest that the frictions can be useful for understanding the empirical evidence on investment-q regressions. This literature documents that firm investment is not well explained by Tobin's q, as the neoclassical adjustment cost model would predict, but instead firm cash flows appear correlated with investment. These findings have sometimes been interpreted as evidence of financial constraints causing distortion in firm investment decisions. We will show that frictional product markets can in fact also generate similar regression results -without implying inefficiencies.
To study the predictions of our theory for investment-q regressions, we simulate data from the model and run the following regressions on our artificial panel of firms:
where q jt = βE t v jt+1 /k jt+1 is Tobin's q. Figure 3 shows how the slope coefficient a 1 and R 2 of the first regression change as we increase the degree of friction in the product market. In the frictionless limit the model generates the results expected for the neoclassical adjustment cost model: the coefficient on Tobin's q coincides with the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, 1/ϕ k = 0.1, and the R 2 is one. As we increase the friction, both the coefficient estimate and R 2 fall significantly. The coefficient estimate falls both because the correlation of investment with Tobin's q falls, and because investment becomes less variable relative to Tobin's q. 20 The latter occurs because the frictions effectively impose an additional adjustment cost on firms. Figure 4 shows how the results change when we include firm cash flow in the regression. In the frictionless limit cash flow is irrelevant, and investment perfectly explained by Tobin's q. But as frictions increase, the coefficient on cash flow quickly becomes significant, while the coefficient on Tobin's q falls. This reflects the hump-shaped responses of investment and profits to shocks, which are not shared by Tobin's q. In this case the R 2 barely falls as frictions increase, however, as the two right-hand-side variables together explain investment well.
As these figures illustrate, product market frictions generate exactly the kinds of departures from the neoclassical theory as have been documented empirically. This makes them poten- tially interesting for understanding the relationship between investment and Tobin's q. The coefficient estimates on Tobin's q are sometimes used to infer the magnitude of the physical adjustment cost -an approach which suggests that those costs are extremely high. A coefficient of 0.025 in an annual regression suggests such high adjustment costs that it would take a firm 1/0.025 ≈ 40 years to double its capital stock. The figure illustrates that this can lead to a substantial overestimate for firms facing frictional product markets. Our benchmark parametrization yields the same coefficient on Tobin's q with substantially smaller physical adjustment costs, roughly implying that it would take a firm 1/0.1 = 10 years to double its capital stock. Ten years may still seem long, but nevertheless represents significant progress toward reconciling the estimates with what seems economically plausible.
As we will see in the next section, in comparing the model to data, the statistic the model has difficulty replicating is the low level of R 2 found in both firm and aggregate level regressions. Even though the remaining gap between model and data may appear sizable, we view the impact of these frictions on the R 2 as quite substantial. Generating effects of the magnitude in Figure 4 within a linearized model driven by a single shock is non-trivial. One could reduce the model R 2 further by allowing non-linearities to play a role, but at the end of the day one would expect a gap between model and data, as our model abstracts from other factors that have been emphasized in the literature, such as measurement error or fixed costs of adjustment.
Because other theories have also been proposed for the investment-q regression evidence,
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it is important to note that our theory does have directly testable predictions which can be used to assess its empirical relevance. Specifically, ceteris paribus in markets with greater product market frictions we should see both lower coefficient estimates on Tobin's q as well as lower R 2 's when regressing investment on Tobin's q. The model also predicts non-trivial cash flow effects. Note, however, that the cash flow effects are nearly constant for a broad range of frictions.
The mechanism: long-term customer relationships We have assumed that product market frictions naturally lead to long-term customer relationships, rendering the customer base a state variable for firm decision making. But one could also imagine frictional markets where customers retain no memory of past suppliers from one period to the next. Would our results continue to hold in such an environment? Figure 6 compares the two cases: frictional markets with (solid line) and without (dashed line) long-term relationships. It shows that even if product market frictions dampen the responses of model variables to shocks in both cases, long-term relationships play an important role in generating the humpshaped responses of variables to shocks. Without them there is no accumulation of customers over time, rendering the customer base a state variable, which plays a key role in attenuating the relationship between investment with Tobin's q. The effects on the regression results are displayed in Table 2 , which shows that the changes in R 2 and the regression coefficient are much more pronounced with long-term customer relationships than without them. It is this role of long-term customer relationships that differentiates ours from the decreasing-returns, or monopolistic-competition, based explanations in Cooper and Ejarque (2003) and Abel and Eberly (2009) . Finally, although the effects illustrated in the figures appear non-trivial in magnitude, will they remain that way if we change the parametrization to a plausible degree? To examine this issue, Appendix B considers the sensitivity of results to lower targets for buying and selling time, as well as higher customer depreciation rates. Even if quantitatively somewhat weaker, the main effects we have discussed still remain significant. Our results are thus not strongly sensitive to the specifics of the parametrization used above.
Aggregate shocks The effects on firm dynamics make frictional product markets particularly promising for understanding responses to aggregate shocks -specifically the humpshaped responses of macro-aggregates to aggregate-level shocks documented in a number of 21 Appendix C relates this paper to the investment-q literature. 
papers.
22 Such hump-shapes are generally at odds with the neoclassical growth model, where variables respond to shocks on impact. Recent literature has emphasized such hump-shapes in particular in investment, resorting to non-standard adjustment cost functions to replicate these patterns in the context of a model (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005) , as simply introducing a standard adjustment cost to investment is not enough. Although we have shown that frictional product markets generate hump-shaped responses to idiosyncratic shocks, a concern might be that the mechanism does not work with aggregate shocks. After all, while firm expansion following a positive firm-level shock requires stealing market share from other firms, an aggregate shock would require an expansion in the total size of the market, leading to aggregate price effects.
The model is straightforward to adapt for analyzing aggregate fluctuations as well, by replacing the firm-specific idiosyncratic productivity shocks by aggregate shocks. 23 The main change in the model involves the discount factors, which must take into account aggregate 22 See e.g. Cogley and Nason (1995) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) , Smets and Wouters (2007) .
23 See Appendix D. fluctuations on marginal utility. Returning to the model to highlight the changes: First, the household objective (1) requires expectations over aggregate shock realizations. The calculation of the return to long-term customer relationships requires both expectations and a change in discount factors to take into account aggregate fluctuations, but this leaves the return to buying as in equation (3), simply adding time subscripts on θ, ε, and w b . The firm problem (F) requires changing the discounting, wage w and return to buying w b to reflect aggregate fluctuations. From a substantive point of view, the cross-sectional heterogeneity disappears: assuming all firms start off alike and face the same aggregate shocks, they will will behave identically over time. The analogue of Proposition 1 then implies that all firms have the same queues and discounts. In times when firms hire more sales people, both queues and discounts are greater. Figure 14 shows how model dynamics in response to an aggregate productivity shock under frictional product markets differ from those under frictionless markets. The main predictions regarding volatility and hump-shaped responses in investment continue to hold also in response to aggregate shocks. The main difference with aggregate shocks would seem to be that the hump-shape in profits weakens, appearing instead in the response of Tobin's q. The former is likely due to the smaller increase in sales personnel in response to an aggregate shock, and the latter the changes in discounting associated with aggregate shocks.
Evidence of Customer Capital
The model makes a number of predictions on the effects of product market frictions on firm investment, sales, profits, value and their dynamic responses to shocks, which appear promising for understanding documented patterns in the data. But is there any direct evidence linking product market frictions to these patterns? This section turns to firm-level data to study this question. Seeking to establish relevance from a macroeconomic point of view, we consider a broad range of industries.
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Data Our primary data source is Compustat, which provides annual accounting data on publicly listed US firms. It is the standard data source for studying firm-level investment, sales, profits and Tobin's q. We restrict our analysis within Compustat to a balanced panel of 648 firms from 1983 to 1999. Balancing simplifies the analysis of firm-level dynamics significantly, but the results are largely robust to extending the sample to the full unbalanced Compustat data (where possible). We exclude foreign firms, utilities and financial firms, as commonly done in the investment literature, as well as mergers and observations with extreme values. Appendix E describes the sample construction more closely.
Measurement of frictions Because product market frictions are likely to be more important in some markets than others, it is natural to use this cross-sectional variation to test the predictions of the model. The non-trivial challenge in doing so is finding a way to measure the degree of friction across markets with available data. The theory suggests a simple approach to this measurement problem, however, by predicting that in markets with greater frictions, firms spend more on marketing and selling. Among the accounting variables reported in Compustat is "selling, general and administrative" (SGA) expenses, which we use as a proxy for selling expenses. Interpreting a market as a two-digit SIC industry, we calculate a time-series average of total industry SGA expenses over total industry sales, and sort industries into two groups on this measure: above and below median. We can then compare the two subsamples on the various predictions of the model discussed in Section 3.
Our sorting variable, SGA expenses, captures selling expenses such as sales people's salaries, commissions and travel expenses, advertising and marketing expenses, shipping expenses, depreciation of sales buildings and equipment, etc. But it is only a proxy for selling expenses because it also includes general and administrative expenses such as executives' salaries, legal and professional fees, insurance, depreciation of office building and equipment, office rents, office supplies, etc. Because these categories are generally not reported separately, a concern may be that SGA expenses are driven by these general and administrative expenses rather than selling expenses. To gauge this concern, we fortunately have separate information on advertising expenditures for a subset of observations. To the extent that the behavior of advertising expenses is closely related to that of broader selling expenses, we can use the advertising data to assess whether SGA expenses are a good proxy for selling expenses. We find that, for the subset of firms reporting both, the cross-sectional correlation between firm level advertising and SGA expenses is 0.35, while the firm-level time series correlation between the two is 0.41. In firm-level data these correlations are quite substantial, supporting using SGA expenses as a proxy for selling expenses. The industries falling into our high and low SGA expense samples are given in Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix E. Consistent with intuition, commodities, for which product market frictions are likely to play a smaller role, fall into the lower selling expense group, while tobacco products and clothing retailers are examples of high selling expense industries. With these considerations in mind, from now on we refer to SGA expenses as selling expenses (SE). Table 3 provides summary statistics for our data, comparing the two subsamples we study. Note that the firms in the sample are quite large overall, and although a large share of firms are in manufacturing, a substantial share are not. The high selling expense sample is slightly smaller, both in terms of numbers of firms, and share of total sales or assets. Perhaps surprisingly, it is also more manufacturing intensive. The main message of the table is that the two subsamples are relatively similar in firm attributes like size and growth rate, although the high selling expense firms are perhaps slightly larger and faster-growing. The table also shows that there are substantial differences across the samples in selling expenses, the sorting variable. Calculating advertising expenditures (when possible) reveals that the high selling expense firms spend significantly more on advertising, supporting using SGA as a measure of selling expenses.
Next, we turn to study the predictions of the model in this data, examining the connection between product market frictions and i) the levels and ii) volatility of investment, sales, Tobin's q, profits, and markups, iii) the lead-lag patterns, and iv) the investment-q regressions.
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Levels The first set of predictions from the model involve a positive relationship between the degree of product market frictions and the overall levels of Tobin's q, profits, markups and sales. To measure these patterns in the data, we calculate, for each firm, time series medians of investment/capital, profits/capital, sales/capital, markups, and Tobin's q. We then take medians across firms of these medians, for each subsample separately. The results are reported in Table 4 . Consistent with the theory, the table reports a significant increase in all of these variables, except for the investment rate, when moving from the low to the high selling expense sample. For the markup, our empirical measure is a rather crude one, revenue over the production cost of goods sold, but the results nevertheless line up with the theory. 
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Sorting industries into two groups has the advantage that it leaves us with two relatively
25 Note that the experiment we conduct in the model differs somewhat from the one in the data: The empirical experiment considers an economy with a number of goods, each demanded separately, where the degree of friction in each particular good's market varies across goods. The model, on the other hand, abstracts from this heterogeneity for the sake of tractability. The implications of product market frictions we have emphasized do not hinge on this simplification, however.
26 The absolute levels of the sales/capital ratio are also significantly higher in both samples than in the model. The model abstracts from intermediate inputs, which raise the overall level of the sales/capital ratio in the data. large samples to study. It is useful to take a look at these patterns on an industry-byindustry basis as well, however, even if sample sizes diminish in doing so. To this end, we compute, for each industry separately, medians across firms of the time-series medians of these variables. To illustrate the patterns, the top two panels in Figure 7 plot industry selling expenses against these measures of industry Tobin's q and profits. Not only is there substantial variation along these dimensions across industries, but the figure displays a clear positive relationship between selling expenses and both Tobin's q and profits.
Volatility The remaining predictions of the model involve firm dynamics. The model predicts that in markets with greater frictions, firms respond to shocks less. If the idiosyncratic shock processes facing firms were similar across markets, according to the model we should observe lower firm volatility in the high selling expense sample. To measure firm volatility, we compute, for each firm, time series standard deviations of investment/capital, sales/capital, profits/capital, markups, and Tobin's q. We then take medians across firms of these standard deviations in each of the two subsamples. The results are reported in the left columns of Table 5 . Instead of a decrease, the table reports a modest to large increase in firm volatility as we move from the low to the high selling expense sample. This overall increase in volatility moving from the low to the high selling expense sample, which goes against the predictions of the model, suggests that firms in the high selling expense sample may face a more variable shock process. In order to control for differences in the shock process we would need to measure the idiosyncratic shocks faced by firms -a non-trivial problem. The model impulse responses in Figure 2 suggests a simple approach to this problem, however, of using Tobin's q as a proxy for the shock. Not only does Tobin's q respond to shocks on impact, independent of frictions, but it is also straightforward to Notes: Each circle corresponds to a 2-digit SIC industry with ten or more firms. The horizontal axis is the time-series average of industry selling expenses relative to industry sales. The top two panels plot, for each industry, medians across firms of time-series medians of firm Tobin's q and profit/capital. The middle two panels plot, for each industry, medians across firms of time-series standard deviations of firm investment/capital and sales/capital. The bottom two panels plot, for each industry, the slope coefficient and R 2 from regression (21) (with both time and fixed effects). We include a fitted line for reference. measure given our data. 27 We make use of Tobin's q to study changes in firm-level volatility as follows. Consider for example investment: we compute, for each firm, the ratio of the time-series standard deviation of the investment rate to the time-series standard deviation of Tobin's q. We then take medians across firms of these ratios, in the two subsamples separately. With the exception of markups, the results, reported in the right columns of Table 5 , show a significant decrease in volatility across the board as we move from the low to the high selling expense sample.
Finally, to help compare model and data, Figure 10 in Appendix B plots the corresponding moments in the model as a function of the degree of friction. It shows that the model predicts a decrease in the volatility of investment, sales and profits, both in absolute terms and relative to Tobin's q. For markups, on the other hand, the model predicts an increase in volatility independent of the measure. This is in contrast with the results in Table 5 , where the volatility of markups rises only when we do not control for the shock process with Tobin's q. While markups are an interesting variable from a macroeconomic point of view, it must be acknowledged that the simple empirical measure of markup reported here is quite crude.
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To illustrate these patterns on an industry-by-industry basis, we compute, for each industry separately, medians across firms of the time series standard deviations above (adjusted by the standard deviation of Tobin's q). The middle two panels of Figure 7 plot industry selling expenses against these industry standard deviations of investment and sales, revealing a clear negative relationship between the two.
Timing of responses The third set of predictions from the model involve the timing of firm responses to shocks. In particular, the model predicts that investment lag both the shock and selling expenses. To examine the evidence on this we compute, for each firm, the time-series correlations of the investment rate with lags and leads of both Tobin's q and selling expenses. The top panels in Figure 8 plot, for both subsamples, medians across firms of these correlations.
To help relate model and data, the bottom panels in Figure 8 plot these correlations in model-simulated data for: the model without frictions (dash-dotted line), the model with frictions (solid line), as well as a version of the model with slightly lower frictions than our benchmark parametrization (dashed line). As the figure shows, the model without frictions predicts a contemporaneous relationship between investment and Tobin's q, and no relationship between investment and selling expenses. In the model with frictions, a lagpattern emerges: investment becomes positively correlated with past values of Tobin's q and selling expenses, and much less so with future values.
Comparing model and data, the model with frictions outperforms the model without frictions 27 Vuolteenaho (2002) argues that cross-sectional variation in Tobin's q is largely driven by variation in expected future cash flow. Firm level variation in q should thus largely reflect variation in fundamentals, i.e. in the context of our model productivity.
28 Based on the model, one would also expect the customer expansion friction to contribute toward greater persistence of sales and investment in the high selling expense sample. There is some limited evidence for these patterns (figures available on request). The top left panel plots, for each subsample separately, medians across firms of the time-series cross-correlation of firm investment/capital with lags and leads of firm Tobin's q. The top right panel plots the same for investment/capital and selling expenses/capital. The bottom panels plot the same moments for model-generated data for the fictionless model, the model with frictions, and the model with frictions parameterized with slightly lower frictions than our benchmark. Tables 13 and 14 in Appendix E report the numbers, including standard errors.
by capturing the lag-patterns in the data. As in the model with frictions, in both subsamples investment is positively correlated with past values of Tobin's q and selling expenses, and much less so with future values. These lag patterns are also somewhat stronger in the high selling expense sample, as the model would predict, but the standard errors on the correlations are too large to allow distinguishing the samples statistically.
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29 Tables 13 and 14 in Appendix E report bootstrapped standard errors. As an alternative story, time-tobuild also generates lead-lag patterns, but renders investment dependent future Tobin's q rather than past, as investment decisions reflect the future value of capital. Time-to-plan has the opposite effect, offering an alternative explanation for the overall lag pattern. The differential timing in the two subsamples supports our theory, but this evidence does not allow distinguishing the two theories statistically. It is not clear that time-to-plan would have any implications for selling expenses, however.
Investment regressions Finally, turning to the implications of the model for investmentq regressions, we run the following panel regression
in the two subsamples separately. 30 Here f j controls for firm fixed effects and d t time effects. The results are presented in Table 6 , with and without time and fixed effects. Overall, the low slope coefficients and R 2 's are consistent with values reported in the empirical literature. But in particular, the results line up with our theory across the subsamples, in that both the slope coefficients and R 2 's fall significantly moving from the low to the high selling expense sample.
31 The bottom panels of Figure 7 illustrate that this negative relationship holds also industry-by-industry. To construct the figure we ran these panel regressions for each industry separately, plotting the resulting slope coefficients and R 2 's against industry selling expenses.
To relate our results to the empirical literature emphasizing cash flow effects, we also run the cash-flow augmented panel regression
in the two subsamples separately. The results, presented in Table 7 , line up with our theory also here. Comparing the two subsamples, we see a significant drop in the slope coefficient on Tobin's q moving from the low to the high selling expense sample. Cash flow is significant across the board, but not necessarily clearly increasing in selling expenses. The differences in R 2 across subsamples are relatively small. These patterns are consistent with the predictions of the model, as illustrated in Figure 4 .
Many studies of firm investment focus on manufacturing industries. Because we view our model as well-suited for analyzing a broader set of industries than manufacturing alone, our empirical work has been based on a sample which includes a substantial share of nonmanufacturing firms. To relate our findings to studies focusing on manufacturing, Tables 15  and 16 in Appendix E report the results restricting the sample to manufacturing firms only. The conclusions continue to hold in this subsample.
Because other theories have also been proposed for the investment-q regression evidence, this cross-industry test is particularly valuable in distinguishing our mechanism from proposed alternatives, such as financing constraints, fixed costs of investment, or market power/decreasing returns in production. The only concern would be if selling expenses were correlated with these other theories in an obvious way. In the case of fixed costs of investing or market power there is no immediate link to selling expenses. In the case of financing constraints, it may well be that firms are more likely to be borrowing-constrained in industries where product market frictions are greater, because a greater share of firm value comes from the intangible capital associated with the customer base, and this intangible capital is less likely to work as collateral. In fact, as Table 3 shows, firms in the high selling expense industries do tend to have slightly less debt than in the low selling expense industries. That these firms also pay greater dividends speaks against the financial constraint theory, however. We discuss the literature on investment and Tobin's q in more detail in Appendix C.
Aggregate shocks We can use the same data to study firm dynamics also in response to more aggregate-level shocks. To that end, we compute aggregate time series of investment, sales, profits, and our other variables of interest by adding up the firm-level observations at each point in time, for each subsample separately. Because these aggregate time series are relatively short, however, we move to the quarterly data in Compustat for this exercise. As is standard with aggregate data, we begin by taking logs, seasonally adjusting the quarterly series, 32 and HP (1600)-filtering before computing moments.
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Returning to the effects of product market frictions on volatility, we compute time-series standard deviations of our aggregate time series, for each subsample separately. Table 8 reports the results. The table shows a significant reduction in volatility as we move from 32 The seasonal adjustment is done by regressing variables on quarter dummies and removing this seasonal component.
33 Note that we follow convention in analyzing firm-level data in levels and aggregate data in logs. While aggregate data are typically analyzed in logs, taking logs becomes problematic with firm-level data due to negative observations (e.g. in profits). the low to the high selling expense sample for investment, profits and sales. The volatility of markups remains roughly unchanged, while the volatility of Tobin's q again shows a significant increase. If we, again, scaled by the volatility of Tobin's q, this would only serve to make the drop in the volatility of investment, profits, and sales across subsamples more striking. Also investment-q regressions run in this aggregate time-series data produce similar results as they did in the firm-level panel regressions before. Table 9 reports the results from timeseries regressions of aggregate investment on Tobin's q and cash flow, in our two subsamples separately. As before, both the slope coefficient and R 2 fall as we move from the low to the high selling expense sample. Moreover, adding cash flow into the regression reveals stronger cash flow effects in the high selling expense sample. The number of observations in these time-series regressions is substantially smaller than in the panel regressions, however, making the samples harder to distinguish statistically.
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As our final exercise, we also consider responses to industry-level shocks, by adding up the firm-level data for each 2-digit SIC industry separately (instead of into just two subsamples). Based on these time series we compute, for each industry, time series standard deviations of our variables of interest, in addition to running time-series investment-q regressions. Figure  9 illustrates the results from these industry-level exercises. In industries with higher average 34 It may appear surprising that these numbers are larger than the standard deviations reported for firmlevel shocks in Table 5 . Recall, however, that these numbers represent percentage variation (the data is logged first), while the firm-level numbers represent absolute variation.
35 Note that the coefficient estimates are not directly comparable to those of the panel regressions, both because the frequency is different, and because these regressions are in logs rather than levels. selling expenses: i) these standard deviations are lower (top panels) and ii) the investment-q regressions yield lower slope coefficients and R 2 's (bottom panels).
Summing up
The model makes a number of predictions which depend on the degree of friction in the product market, and the goal of this section has been to document, across a broad range of markets and differing degrees of aggregation, the evidence on these patterns. Our measure of selling expenses, while not perfect, plays an important role in this by offering a way of quantifying the degree of friction in a market, in order to evaluate whether there is direct evidence linking product market frictions to the predictions of the model. We find support for a broad range of these predictions, although the evidence is arguably stronger for some predictions than others. The differences across samples are clearly significant for the level effects, the relative volatilities, and the basic investment-q regression results. The evidence is somewhat less conclusive for the cross-correlations measuring lagged responses, where the standard errors are also larger.
Related Literature
The notion of a customer market, formalized by Phelps and Winter (1970) , has a long tradition in macroeconomics -albeit one which has suffered from difficulties in modeling, which have diverted researchers to the tractable monopolistic competition framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) instead. Important contributions include Bils (1989) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) , seeking to understand the cyclical behavior of markups. The literature remains active, with recent contributions e.g. by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) , Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009) . These papers typically focus on firm price-setting behavior and markups: the first under consumption habits, the second under asymmetric information, and the third in a dynamic general equilibrium model with market share concerns. Our focus is on the effects on quantities instead, which may provide more direct evidence on the impact of customer base concerns.
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36 The only paper we are aware of in this literature which considers the interactions of physical investment and the customer base is Lundin, Gottfries, Bucht, and Lindstrom (2009) , who show that financial constraints
The notion of a customer base is commonplace in the marketing and industrial organization literatures. Within industrial organization, the customer base is often associated with switching costs rather than search frictions, however (for surveys, see e.g. Klemperer 1995, Farrell and Klemperer 2007) . The firm dynamics we emphasize stem from convex costs to customer base expansion, so potentially they could arise from switching costs as well, if such convexities were present. Recent empirical work within industrial organization documents that firm expansion appears constrained by customer base concerns : Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2009) show that, in US manufacturing, new plants face a demand gap relative to incumbents which closes only slowly as plants mature. In a related vein, customer base concerns are becoming increasingly recognized also within the international trade and international macroeconomics literatures, where recent research uses them to explain exports and international pricing (e.g. Alessandria 2004, Arkolakis Forthcoming, Drozd and Nosal Forthcoming, Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, Krizan, and Tybout 2010) .
A Planning Problem
This section shows that the optimality conditions of the planning problem in Section 3 coincide with those of the market equilibrium. We focus on the first order conditions, due to the strict concavity of the planning problem.
The envelope conditions of the planning problem read, for a given x = (k, n, z),
The FOC for l s (x) reads
and the FOC for i(x)
Defining
, the envelope conditions can be written as
Restricting attention to a stationary environment implies that consumption and leisure remain constant, so u c (c
The envelope conditions thus reduce to those of the market equilibrium. Similarly, equation (27) reduces to the market condition (12).
Combining equations (25) and (26) 
If we define ε(x) := θ(x)η ′ (θ(x))/η(θ(x)) × v n (λ), this equation reduces to equation (10) characterizing the market equilibrium, with ε(x) playing the role of the discount. Defining the discount in this way also implies that the market condition (11) holds. Finally, equation (26) reduces to w = η ′ (θ(x))v n (λ), or w = µ(θ(x))ε(x). This implies equation (4).
B Parametrization, Solution Method and Sensitivity
Solution method We solve the model numerically, using a log-linear approximation around the non-stochastic steady state. More precisely, we first solve for the non-stochastic steady state, and then log-linearize the model around this steady state. This solution method has the advantage that, by abstracting from non-linearities in firm dynamics, it underlines the fact that the key mechanism in our model does not rely on non-linearities. We use the same approach also for the model aggregate shocks.
Parametrization of γ and ξ These parameters are determined by targets for total buying and selling time. In the non-stochastic steady state of the model, total buying time is simply l b , while integrating over measure one identical firms gives κ(l s ) total selling time. Specifying κ(l s ) = (l s ) 2 /2, these targets also determine values for l s and θ = l b /l s . This pins down γ, because the result of Proposition 1 that
2 ). The value of γ is thus determined by the relative shares of time in buying versus selling activities. Given these relative shares, the overall scale of buying and selling activity is increasing in the degree of friction, and thus the targets for buying and selling time also pin down ξ.
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Moments in the model As illustrated by Figure 10 , the model predicts a dampening in firm investment, sales, profits and Tobin's q as frictions increase. Observing higher volatility in the high selling expense subsample thus suggests that firms in that sample may face a more variable shock process. This means that testing for the reduction in volatility due to product market frictions requires controlling for the shock process. To this end, we scale the standard deviations of investment, sales and profits by that of Tobin's q. As the figure confirms, the model predicts that also these scaled moments decrease in the friction.
Sensitivity To assess the sensitivity of our results to the parametrization, we vary the targets for buying time, selling time, and customer depreciation. Figure 11 shows how the dynamics change when steady-state buying time is reduced by 50 percent to 0.265, Figure  12 when steady-state selling time is reduced by 50 percent to 1.15, and Figure 13 when the customer depreciation rate is increased by 50 percent to 22.5. Table 10 shows how these changes affect the various simulated moments of the model. Notes: Each circle corresponds to a 2-digit SIC industry with ten or more firms. The horizontal axis shows the time-series average of industry selling expenses relative to sales. The top two panels plot the time-series standard deviations of industry investment and industry sales, and the bottom two results from the timeseries regression of industry investment on industry Tobin's q. We include a fitted line for reference. For expositional reasons, the axis scaling leaves two industries with low selling expenses and particularly high investment volatility outside the top-left panel. Notes: The table reports standard deviations of model variables both in absolute terms and relative to the standard deviation of Tobin's q. The moments are based on simulated data from the model. In comparing these results to the impulse responses in Figure 2 , note that these moments measure absolute variation, while the impulse responses measure percentage variation. The differences are explained by the effect of frictions on the means. Notes: The table reports moments based on model simulated data. The first column is the frictionless limit, the second our benchmark parametrization, the third a parametrization with 50% lower buying time, the fourth with 50% lower selling time, and the fifth with 50% higher customer depreciation. 
C Literature on Investment and Tobin's q
This section relates our paper to the vast literature on the q-theory of investment.
38 The central theoretical benchmark in this literature is that under homogeneity of profits and adjustment costs, the shadow value of capital equals Tobin's q (Hayashi 1982) . 39 This result led to an empirical investigation of the adjustment cost model, as Tobin's q is measurable for publicly listed corporations based on the market value of equity and debt. The theory predicts that a regression of the investment rate on Tobin's q should yield a slope coefficient equaling the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter and an R 2 of one. Both time-series and panel studies find low slope coefficients (e.g. Summers 1981 , Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988 , Hassett and Hubbard 1997 , suggesting implausibly large physical adjustment costs, as well as low R 2 's. The same studies also find cash flow effects to be large. This evidence contradicts the adjustment cost model, which predicts Tobin's q to be a sufficient statistic for investment.
These negative results have led to various responses. One strand of research argues that q-theory may still be a good approximation, working better if Tobin's q is measured by a "fundamental q" instead of stock market value (Abel and Blanchard 1986 , Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995 , Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner 2006 , allowing measurement error (Erickson and Whited 2000) , or using bond prices (Philippon 2009) . A limitation of these studies is that they do not explain why stock prices are poor measures of investment opportunities. Our model builds an explicit mechanism whereby the correlation of investment and Tobin's q is weakened, even without measurement error or "bubbles" which may influence stock prices further.
A second, larger strand of research builds theoretical models that relax the homogeneity assumptions. For example, Cooper and Ejarque (2003) and Abel and Eberly (2009) consider market power (or decreasing returns to scale), Abel and Eberly (1994) , Caballero and Leahy (1996) , and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) non-convex or non-homogeneous adjustment costs, and Gomes (2001) , Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007) , and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (Forthcoming) financing constraints. But even though these additions invalidate Hayashi's theoretical result, they need not imply that q-regressions work poorly. For example, Caballero and Leahy (1996) show that in a model with fixed costs of investing, q-regressions may work well even if the relation between investment and the shadow value of capital is not well-defined. Similarly, Gomes (2001) shows that in a model with financing constraints, qregression may work well quantitatively because Tobin's q proxies for firm productivity (and its ability to get funding).
40 In sum, although there are many ways to break the analytical result, few papers can replicate the failure of investment regressions observed in the data. In fact, to explain these patterns studies typically appeal to measurement error in q (e.g. Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent 2009) .discount future profits with the probability-normalized pricesβ t instead of β t . Starting all firms with the same initial conditions implies that they remain identical forever. Aggregate variables are thus just a multiples of firm level variables and the measure of firms, one. The firm optimality conditions now imply that: i) all firms hiring the same measure of sales people offer the same discount and have identical queues, and ii) in times when firms hire more sales people, queues are longer and discounts (relative to wages) higher: PROPOSITION 2. Queues and discounts are increasing in the choice of sales personnel l s t : θ t = γ/(1 − γ) × κ ′ (l s t ) and ε t = w t θ 1−γ t /ξ.
The definition of equilibrium extends with straightforward changes from the text. 
E Data
For comparability with existing literature, we use the Compustat industrial annual data from 1983 to 1999, with the following standard exclusions: First, we drop firms with primary SIC classification between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 and 4999, representing utilities and financial firms. We also drop foreign firms. Second, we drop firms with negative or zero book value of capital (Items 7 and 8), sales (Item 12), assets (Item 6), selling, general and 
